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SHOULD THE MEDIUM AFFECT THE MESSAGE?
LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF PROSECUTORS READING
INMATE-ATTORNEY EMAIL
Brandon P. Ruben*
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential legal communications
between a party and her attorney from being used against her, thus
encouraging full and frank attorney-client communication. It is a venerable
evidentiary principle of American jurisprudence.
Unsurprisingly,
prosecutors may not eavesdrop on inmate-attorney visits or phone calls or
read inmate-attorney postal mail. Courts are currently divided, however,
as to whether or not they can forbid prosecutors from reading inmateattorney email.
This Note explores the cases that address whether federal prosecutors
may read inmates’ legal email. As courts have unanimously held, because
inmates know that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) monitors all their email,
their legal email is unprivileged. In addition, all courts have rejected the
argument that prosecutors reading inmates’ legal email impermissibly
restricts inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel. Accordingly,
despite questioning the practice’s propriety, four courts have ruled that
there is no legal basis to prevent prosecutors from reading inmate-attorney
email. Two courts, however, pursuant to no clear authority, prevented the
prosecutors from doing so.
This Note argues that prosecutors should abstain from reading inmateattorney email as a matter of self-regulation because this behavior
unjustifiably chills inmate-attorney communication. In addition, this Note
asserts that BOP’s email monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts
inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel, a challenge
prisoners’ rights advocates have yet to bring. In cases where BOP’s email
monitoring policy is not at issue, or where a court seeks to avoid a
constitutional decision, this Note concludes that courts should prevent
prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email by exercising their delegated
authority to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, courts
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2010, Columbia
University; B.A., 2007, McGill University. Special thanks are due to Professor Bruce A.
Green for guiding me throughout this project. For reading earlier drafts, I thank Professors
Michael B. Mushlin and Julian Arato as well as Yahshuah A. Ford, Esq. I also thank my
family for their encouragement. Most of all, I thank my wife Lianna for her love and for
always inspiring me.
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should invoke Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: you are a busy defense attorney and one
of your many clients is detained in federal prison awaiting trial. She is
accused of a crime but presumably innocent and you are doing all you can
to defend against the U.S. government’s impending attempt to deprive her
of her liberty. To communicate with her, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
allows you to make in-person visits.1 If you account for travel time and
security clearance, however, these can consume the better part of your
workday.2 BOP also provides for confidential postal mail,3 though physical
mail’s inefficiency makes it a patently unattractive option. In addition,
BOP allows you to arrange for confidential legal phone calls.4 Depending
on the cooperativeness of the correctional officer you deal with, however,
arranging one can take as long as a month.5
To provide for more efficient inmate communications, since 2006 BOP
has enabled inmates to send and receive email via the Trust Fund Limited
Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS).6 Assuming your client is
computer literate, this would be your best choice, by far, to communicate
with her day-to-day. There is, however, just one catch: in order to use
TRULINCS your client must sign a form acknowledging that BOP
1. 28 C.F.R § 543.13(b) (2012) (“The Warden generally may not limit the frequency of
attorney visits . . . [which are to] take place in a private conference room, if available . . . .”).
2. See infra note 293.
3. 28 C.F.R. § 540.18(a) (“The Warden shall open . . . special mail only in the presence
of the inmate for inspection of . . . contraband . . . . The correspondence may not be read.”).
4. Id. § 540.102 (“The Warden shall notify an inmate of the proper procedures to have
an unmonitored telephone conversation with an attorney.”).
5. See infra note 293.
6. See generally TRULINCS Topics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/
inmates/trulincs.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
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monitors all her emails, including her legal emails.7 In turn, any email she
sends or receives is not protected by the attorney-client privilege and, as
four courts have ruled, fair game for the prosecution to read and use as
evidence against her.8
“That’s hogwash,” a judge in the Eastern District of New York
exclaimed during a recent pretrial conference discussing this issue.9 The
rebuke followed an Assistant United States Attorney’s statement that the
government had “no interest” in reading inmate-attorney emails and would
“do their best not to” when reviewing the PDF file of all the defendant’s
emails BOP provides the government upon request.10 As the prosecutor
explained, the government used to assign a team of staff members to
segregate defendants’ legal emails from their personal emails, but this
practice became too expensive.11 The government’s decision to read
inmate-attorney email, the prosecutor thus emphasized, was motivated by
administrative necessity as opposed to the desire to gain a strategic
advantage.12
To the judge, the prosecutor’s remarks appeared particularly
disingenuous given that his office recently issued a letter to the Federal
Defenders of New York for the Eastern District declaring, “emails between
inmates and their attorneys . . . are not privileged and [the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Eastern District of New York] intends to review [them].”13
“In this case,” the judge proclaimed, “the government will be precluded
from looking at any of the attorney-client emails, period.”14
When the transcript of this proceeding became public, the mainstream
and legal media denounced the government’s decision to read inmateattorney emails as a “draconian and Kafkaesque” violation of the attorney-

7. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE AGREEMENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN TRULINCS
ELECTRONIC MESSAGING PROGRAM § 2(D) [hereinafter BOP’S EMAIL MONITORING POLICY],
available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/forms/BP_A0934.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2015)
(“Consent to Monitoring. I am notified of, acknowledge, and voluntarily consent to having
my messages . . . read . . . by Bureau staff . . . . I am notified of, acknowledge, and
voluntarily consent that this provision applies to messages both to and from my
attorney . . . and that such messages will not be treated as privileged communications.”).
8. See infra Part I.A–B, D, F.
9. Transcript of Criminal Cause for Status Conference Before the Honorable Dora L.
Irizarry at 17, United States v. Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014)
[hereinafter Tr. of Ahmed Conference], available at http://kmbllaw.com/documents/
CorrlinksPrivilegeHearing.pdf.
10. Id. As the government has explained elsewhere, BOP provides them a single PDF
document containing all emails an inmate has sent and received via TRULINCS, including
those to and from her attorney. Response in Opposition re: 34 First Motion in Limine re:
Defendant Emails to Counsel at 2, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July
16, 2014).
11. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
13. Letter from James G. McGovern, Chief, Criminal Div. of the U.S. Att’y for the
E.D.N.Y. to Peter Kircheimer, Att’y-in-Charge, Fed. Defenders of N.Y. for the E.D. 1 (June
9, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter McGovern Letter], available at
http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions14/072214letter.pdf.
14. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21.
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client privilege.15 Two subsequent rulings from the Eastern District of New
York, however, deemed the practice perfectly legal, if not commendable,
because federal inmates are on notice that all their emails—including legal
emails—are monitored and therefore unprivileged.16
This Note assesses the recent rulings (which this Note will refer to as
“the email cases”) that have divided on whether BOP’s email monitoring
policy17 gives the government carte blanche to read inmates’ legal email.
After summarizing these cases, this Note explores in succession the four
major issues they have evoked: (1) why inmates’ legal emails are not
privileged,18 (2) whether prosecutors should nevertheless abstain from
reading them as a matter of self-regulation,19 (3) whether prosecutors
reading inmate-attorney email is unconstitutional,20 and (4) whether courts
possess independent authority to forbid them from doing so.21
Part I summarizes the six cases that have addressed the issue of a
prosecutor reading an inmate-defendant’s legal email. Part II begins by
describing the attorney-client privilege generally.22 It then explains why
these cases have unanimously held that it does not apply to inmates’ legal
email.23 Part III explores the concept of prosecutorial self-regulation and
considers both sides of the argument surrounding whether prosecutors
should abstain from reading inmates’ legal email even though it is
unprivileged. It concludes that they should because doing so unjustifiably
chills inmates’ ability to communicate confidentially with their counsel.
This Note then explores the arguments defendants have made in
opposition to prosecutors who have chosen to read, or threatened to read,
their legal email. Part IV examines the defendants’ argument that the
prosecutors’ acts of reading their legal email impermissibly restrict their
Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel.24 This part notes that all
courts in the email cases have rejected the defendants’ constitutional
claims.25 It asserts, however, that this is because the defendants have
attacked the individual prosecutors’ acts as opposed to BOP’s email

15. Marlisse Silver Sweeney, Prosecutors Read Jailhouse Emails to Attorneys, L. TECH.
NEWS (July 24, 2014), https://advance.lexis.com (within “Browse Sources” search for Law
Technology News; then follow “Get Documents” link; then search for article’s title); see
also, e.g., Editorial, Privacy for Prisoners: Inmates Have a Right to Attorney-Client
Privilege, Even in Email, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2014, at A20; Editorial, Prosecutors
Snooping on Legal Mail, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2014, at A26.
16. Opinion and Order at 2–3, United States v. Asaro, No. 1:14-cr-0026 (E.D.N.Y. July
17, 2014) [hereinafter Asaro Order]; Memorandum and Order re 25 Motion in Limine As to
Tushar Walia at 28–29, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014)
[hereinafter Walia Order].
17. See EMAIL MONITORING POLICY, supra note 7.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.A–C.
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See infra Part III.C.
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monitoring policy.26 Part IV concludes that constitutional challenges to
prison regulations require courts to apply stricter standards of review under
which BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates’ right
of access to counsel.27
Despite this seemingly meritorious challenge, Part V explains that the
inquiry does not end here. In future litigations, as in the email cases, courts
may seek to avoid rendering a constitutional decision as they often do.28
Part V discusses delegated and non-delegated powers federal courts employ
to independently regulate prosecutorial conduct they deem improper.29 In
the email cases, courts have divided over whether they can apply these
powers. This part asserts that courts can and should prevent prosecutors
from reading inmates’ email pursuant to their delegated authority to enforce
Rules of Professional Conduct.30 Specifically, Part V concludes, courts
should invoke Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.31
I. THE EMAIL CASES: WHEN PROSECUTORS READ, OR THREATEN TO
READ, AN INMATE-DEFENDANT’S LEGAL EMAIL
This part briefly summarizes the six cases to address a prosecutor reading
an inmate-defendant’s legal email.
A. United States v. Fumo
In 2009, Vincent J. Fumo, a former Pennsylvania state senator, was
sentenced to fifty-five months in federal prison for charges relating to fraud,
tax evasion, and obstruction of justice.32 The government subsequently
appealed, requesting a lengthier sentence based partially on an “explosive
trove” of crude emails Fumo sent via TRULINCS to people he knew,
including his attorneys.33 Ultimately, the court resentenced Fumo to an
additional six months in prison, citing the emails as evidence that he was
unwilling to accept responsibility for his crimes.34
B. FTC v. National Urological Group, Inc.
In 2008, Jared Wheat, an ill-reputed pharmaceutical distributor, was
enjoined from making statements about his company’s products unless they
26. See infra Part III.D.
27. See infra Part III.D.
28. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Part IV.A.
30. See infra Part V.C.
31. See infra Part V.C.
32. United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2011).
33. Id. at 294; see, e.g., Supplemental Reply Sentencing Memorandum and Certificate of
Service As to Vincent J. Fumo at 7–8, United States v. Luchko, No. 2:06-cr-00319 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 28, 2011) (citing emails where the defendant stated, “I do feel Christlike in the injustice
I have suffered,” compared himself to Jews in concentration camps, and called the jury that
convicted him “dumb, corrupt, and prejudiced”).
34. Transcript Sentencing Hearing Held on 11/10/11 at 47–48, Luchko, No. 2:06-cr00319 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2011), ECF No. 926.
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were scientifically substantiated.35 From 2009 through 2010, Wheat was
incarcerated for a separate conviction.36 In 2011, he was held in contempt
for violating the 2008 injunction by continuing to advertise his products
with unsubstantiated claims.37 As a major part of their case, the
government submitted TRULINCS emails between Wheat and his attorney,
sent during his 2009–2010 prison term that proved that he was aware his
new advertisements would violate the 2008 injunction.38 The court allowed
the emails in as evidence and explicitly referenced them in holding Wheat
in contempt of the 2008 injunction.39
C. United States v. Saade
On February 8, 2011, Maroun Saade was indicted in the Southern District
of New York for charges relating to aiding and abetting the Taliban.40 At
an early pretrial conference defense counsel notified the court that she
received enclosures from the government containing recordings of all of her
client’s emails and phone calls sent from the BOP facility where he was
detained.41 After a discussion among the court, prosecutor and defense
attorney, in which the court expressed its disapproval of the government
possessing the defendant’s legal emails and calls, the prosecutor stated that
he would discontinue reviewing the defendant’s legal communications.42
D. United States v. Asaro
On January 23, 2014, Thomas Di Fiore, along with other members of the
notorious Bonanno crime family, was indicted in the Eastern District of
New York for charges relating to extortionate collection of credit.43
Awaiting trial, he was detained at a BOP facility.44 On June 9, 2014, the
government notified the Eastern District bar, including DiFiore’s defense
attorneys, that from then on it would be reading all emails inmates send via
TRULINCS.45 Defense counsel sent a letter of objection to the court46 and
in reply—unlike in Fumo, National Urological Group or Saade—the
35. FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294, 2014 WL 3893796, at *1
(N.D. Ga. May 14, 2014).
36. Id. at *3.
37. Id. at *4.
38. Id. at *4–5.
39. Id. (citing emails between Wheat and his counsel that prove Wheat made claims
“that [his] counsel believed were prohibited”).
40. Sealed Indictment, United States v. Saade, No. 1:11-cr-00111 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,
2011).
41. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Saade Held on 9/26/2011 at 7, Saade, No.
1:11-cr-00111 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011).
42. Id. at 9–10.
43. Sealed Indictment As to Vincent Asaro, United States v. Asaro, No. 1:14-cr-00026
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014).
44. Letter Request to Preclude Gov’t from Reading Att’y/Client Email—Redacted As to
Thomas DiFiore at 4, Asaro, No. 1:14-cr-00026 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2014) [hereinafter
DiFiore Letter].
45. McGovern Letter, supra note 13, at 1.
46. DiFiore Letter, supra note 44, at 4.
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government justified its decision.47 It stated that it used to voluntarily
assign a “taint team”—or group of staff members not assigned to a given
case—to redact legal emails from the single PDF of all an inmate’s emails
BOP provides, but it decided to discontinue this practice because it had
become an administrative burden.48 The government emphasized that its
decision to read inmates’ legal email was thus motivated by “practical” as
opposed to “strategic” concerns.”49 Ultimately, the court issued a written
order permitting the government to read the defendant’s legal emails going
forward.50
E. United States v. Ahmed
On May 12, 2014, Dr. Syed Imran Ahmed was indicted in the Eastern
District of New York for charges relating to Medicare fraud.51 Like the
defendants in Asaro and Saade, he was detained at a BOP facility prior to
trial.52 On June 9, 2014, Ahmed’s defense attorney received the same letter
that defense counsel in Asaro received, regarding the government’s intent to
review inmates’ legal email, and filed a letter of objection with the court.53
As in Asaro, the government justified its decision as an administrative
necessity as opposed to an attempt to gain a strategic advantage.54 At a
hearing addressing this issue, the court, pursuant to no clear authority,
explicitly forbade the government from reading the defendant’s legal
emails.55
F. United States v. Walia
On September 19, 2014, in the Eastern District of New York, Tushar
Walia was convicted of charges relating to distribution of a controlled
substance.56 Throughout the course of his trial he was detained, like the
defendants in Asaro, Saade, and Ahmed in a BOP facility.57 As in these
prior cases, on June 9, 2014, Walia’s defense counsel received notification

47. Letter Responding in Opposition to the Defendant’s Application at 1–5, Asaro, No.
1:14-cr-00026 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2014).
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id.
50. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 3.
51. Indictment As to Syed Imran Ahmed, United States v. Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277
(E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2014).
52. Order of Detention As to Syed Imran Ahmed, Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 4, 2014).
53. Letter to the Honorable Dora L. Irizarry Respectfully Responding to the Gov’t’s
June 16 Letter Regarding Emails Sent Between Counsel and Dr. Ahmed Through Bureau of
Prison’s Email System (TRULINCS) As to Syed Imran Ahmed, Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277
(E.D.N.Y. June 20, 2014) [hereinafter Irizarry Letter].
54. Letter re: Emails Through Bureau of Prisons’ TRULINCS System As to Syed Imran
Ahmed at 5, Ahmed, No. 1:14-cr-00277 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2014).
55. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21.
56. Jury Verdict As to Tushar Walia at 8–9, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2014).
57. Reply to Response to Motion re: 34 First Motion in Limine re: Defendant Emails to
Counsel at 2, Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014).
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of the government’s intent to read his legal email. He petitioned the court
to prevent this,58 and the government explained that its decision was
motivated by the need to conserve resources.59 Like in Asaro, the court
ultimately issued a written order allowing the government to read the
defendant’s legal emails.60
In sum, the Fumo and National Urological Group courts allowed the
defendant’s legal emails in as evidence61 and the Asaro and Walia courts
gave the prosecutor permission to read them.62 By contrast, the Saade court
persuaded the prosecutor to abstain from reading the defendant’s legal
email,63 and the Ahmed court, which ruled in the same month and in the
same district as the Asaro and Walia courts,64 explicitly forbade it.65
The remainder of this Note explores: why none of these courts found the
defendants’ legal emails privileged;66 whether prosecutors should
nevertheless abstain from reading them as a matter of self-regulation;67
whether it is unconstitutional for prosecutors to read inmate-attorney
email;68 and whether, apart from the privilege and constitutional issues,
courts possess independent authority to forbid prosecutors from reading
defendants’ legal email if they deem this conduct improper.69
II. WHY INMATES’ LEGAL EMAIL IS NOT PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE
This part explains why, as courts have unanimously held, inmates’ legal
email sent via TRULINCS is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Part II.A describes the attorney-client privilege generally and explains that
it does not attach to communications made in a third party’s presence. Part
II.B explains that courts have found inmates’ monitored phone calls
unprivileged under the theory that the phone recording device is the
equivalent of a third party. Part II.C discusses how the email cases have
relied on this precedent in unanimously holding that inmates’ monitored
emails are likewise unprivileged.

58. First Motion in Limine re: Defendant Emails to Counsel at 2, Walia, No. 1:14-cr00213 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014) [hereinafter First Walia Motion].
59. Response in Opposition re: 34 First Motion in Limine re: Defendant Email to
Counsel at 3, Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) (“[A]s periodic hiring
freezes . . . drastically reduced the government’s resources, it became too burdensome to
appoint [additional staff] to every case in which the government requested an inmate’s
TRULINCS emails.”).
60. Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30.
61. See supra Part I.A–C.
62. See supra Part I.D, F.
63. See supra Part I.C.
64. Compare Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, with Asaro Order, supra note 16,
and Walia order, supra note 16.
65. See supra Part I.E.
66. See supra Part II.
67. See supra Part III.
68. See supra Part IV.
69. See supra Part V.
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A. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Third-Party Presence
The attorney-client privilege is a venerable common law rule of
evidence.70 According to Dean Wigmore, it first appeared in the midsixteenth century as a “natural,” “unquestioned” exception to testimonial
compulsion.71 Today, the attorney-client privilege maintains its “exalted
place in our jurisprudence;”72 it is recognized in every U.S. jurisdiction.73
As the U.S. Supreme Court famously articulated, its purpose is to
encourage “full and frank” attorney-client communication, thereby
promoting “broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”74
In defining the attorney-client privilege, federal courts frequently utilize
the definition Dean Wigmore proposed.75 Alternatively, the Second Circuit
employs the following pithy formulation: “the attorney-client privilege
protects communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney
(2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the
purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.”76
As commentators note, the justice system does not view the attorneyclient privilege as absolute because, like all evidentiary privileges, in
protecting information it impedes the truth-seeking process.77 Accordingly,
the privilege is generally held not to apply if (1) the communication is
deemed to have been between a client and someone other than an
attorney,78 (2) the communication was not confidential,79 or (3) the client
sought something other than legal assistance.80
70. FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law . . . governs a claim of privilege unless any of
the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court.”); 1 RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
UNITED STATES § 2:1 (2014) (“We readily acknowledge the importance of the attorney-client
privilege, which is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.”
(citing Mohawk Indus. Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009)).
71. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542–43
(McNaughton rev ed. 1961). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978) (arguing that the
“recognition of the privilege was slow and halting until after 1800”).
72. In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2005).
73. LEONARD ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 6.2.4 (2013).
74. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
75. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality
Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 855 (1998) (citing WIGMORE, supra note 71,
§ 2290, at 554 (“(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.”)).
76. United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011).
77. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client’s Confidences: One
Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 349 (1981);
Laurence A. Steckman & Richard Granofsky, The Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege by
Counsel in Legal Malpractice Cases: Policy, Privilege, and the Search for Truth in Cases
Involving Implied Waivers, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 839, 879–80 (2010).
78. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Borg, No. 93-15566, 1994 WL 327328, *1 (9th Cir. July 8,
1994) (concluding that the privilege was not applicable because the inmate did not contend
that he believed the “jailhouse lawyer” was actually authorized to practice law).
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The relevant question in the email cases is whether or not legal emails
inmates know are monitored can be considered confidential.81 Even if a
party asserts that she intended for a given legal communication to remain
confidential, courts generally hold her intent to be irrelevant if her conduct
belies it.82 Thus when a party knowingly discloses information in front of a
third party, or fails to take reasonable precautions to guard against a third
party overhearing, courts generally find that confidentiality could not have
been intended and that the privilege therefore does not attach.83
B. Because Courts Consider the Phone Recording Device a Third Party,
Inmates’ Monitored Phone Calls Are Not Privileged
At all BOP facilities inmates’ telephone calls may be monitored.84 The
prison warden is statutorily required to put inmates on notice of this
policy.85 In addition, all BOP facilities are required to enable inmates to
place unmonitored legal phone calls.86 These circumstances have called
into question whether or not a call an inmate places to an attorney on a line
the inmate knows to be monitored is privileged; federal courts have held
that it is not.87
In the email cases, the courts have relied on United States v. Hatcher88
and United States v. Mejia89 in holding that, like monitored phone calls,
emails inmates send via TRULINCS are unprivileged.90 In Hatcher, the
appellant argued that the district court erred in refusing to order the
government to turn over conversations between cooperating coconspirators
79. Bower v. Weisman, 669 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the
privilege did not apply to defendant’s letter to his attorney because it was left spread out on a
table in an office’s waiting room and thus not confidential).
80. United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that because
the privilege “extends only to . . . communications made for the purpose of
facilitating . . . legal services . . . transferring funds and facilitating transactions . . . were not
privileged”).
81. See infra Part II.B.
82. RICE ET AL., supra note 70, § 9:24.
83. Id. §§ 6:7, 9:25; see, e.g., United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 723 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that statements made by a client to his attorney over the telephone while detectives
were searching his house were not privileged); Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., No. CIV.A. 877132, 1988 WL 99713, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988) (holding that confidential documents
inadvertently given to opposing counsel during discovery were not privileged because the
error was due to carelessness).
84. 28 C.F.R. § 540.102 (2012) (“The Warden shall establish procedures that enable
monitoring of telephone conversations on any telephone located within the institution . . . .”).
85. Id. (“The Warden must provide notice to the inmate of the potential for
monitoring.”).
86. Id. (“The Warden shall notify an inmate of the proper procedures to have an
unmonitored telephone conversation with an attorney.”).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132–35 (2d Cir. 2011); United States
v. Hatcher, 323 F.3d 666, 674 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mitchell, No. 3:11-CR248(S1)-J-34, 2013 WL 3808152, at *12 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013); United States v.
Landers, No. 1:12-CR-88-TWT, 2012 WL 6214627, at *4–6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2012);
United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820, 827–28 (E.D. Va. 2005).
88. 323 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 2003).
89. 655 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011).
90. See infra Part II.C.
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and the government, which took place over a prison line all parties knew
was monitored.91 The government argued that the conversations were
protected by the attorney-client privilege and the district court agreed.92
The Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed—concluding that because the
“presence of the recording device was the functional equivalent of a third
party,” the parties could not have expected their conversations to remain
confidential and therefore the privilege did not attach.93
In Mejia, the appellant argued that the district court erred in admitting
part of a prison call he knew was recorded in which he told his sister to tell
his brother to tell his attorney that he wanted to accept a plea before he was
indicted.94 The government, citing Hatcher but taking the opposite
position, asserted that the conversation was not privileged because it was
made to a third party (i.e., his sister) in the presence of another third party
(i.e., the recording device).95 The Second Circuit agreed and affirmed the
district court’s decision to admit the call.96
C. Because Courts Consider the Email Monitoring Device a Third Party,
No Court Has Held That Inmates’ Emails Are Privileged
In Fumo, the issue of whether the emails defendant sent via TRULINCS
were privileged was not litigated because defense counsel stipulated to the
government’s argument that in using TRULINCS, which defendant knew
was monitored, he had no expectation of privacy and thus “waived the
privilege.”97 In Saade, the privilege issue was likewise never subject to
formal legal analysis because the court persuaded the prosecutor to stop
reading the defendant’s legal emails shortly after the issue was first raised at
a pretrial hearing.98 In the remaining email cases, the courts, adopting the
government’s argument, ruled that the emails were unprivileged because:
(1) the defendants’ were on notice that their emails were monitored, (2) the
computer monitoring system—like the phone recording device in Hatcher
and Mejia—is the equivalent of a third party, (3) communications
knowingly made in front of third parties cannot be confidential, and
91. Hatcher, 323 F.3d at 674.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Mejia, 655 F.3d at 129. The government sought to introduce this conversation as
evidence of the appellant’s guilty conscience. Id.
95. Id. at 130.
96. Id. at 133.
97. Transcript Sentencing Hearing Held on 11/10/11 at 93, United States v. Luchko, No.
2:06-cr-00319 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2011), ECF. No. 925. In making this argument, the
government cited no legal authority in any proceeding or in their brief. Id; Sentencing
Memorandum and Certificate of Service by USA As to Vincent J. Fumo, Luchko, No. 2:06cr-00319 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2011).
98. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. While the Saade court never claimed the
emails were privileged, it is the only court to even balk at the suggestion that they are
unprivileged. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Saade Held on 9/26/2011 at 11,
United States v. Saade, No. 1:11-cr-00111 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (“[Prosecutor]:
[A]bove every phone is a warning saying that these are monitored phones, and so that could
operate as a waiver . . . The Court: I don’t think you really argue that position. I don’t think
your office takes that . . . position.”).
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(4) confidentiality is required for a communication to be protected by the
attorney-client privilege.99
III. EVEN THOUGH INMATES’ LEGAL EMAIL IS UNPRIVILEGED,
SHOULD PROSECUTORS ABSTAIN FROM READING IT
AS A MATTER OF SELF-REGULATION?
As Part II explained to qualify for the attorney-client privilege, a
communication must be confidential.100 As the email cases unanimously
hold, because communications knowingly made in front of third parties are
not confidential, and because under Hatcher and Mejia prison monitoring
devices are considered third parties, federal inmates’ email is not
confidential, as the inmates know it is monitored, and it is therefore
unprivileged.101 Attorneys may review non-confidential information. From
a legally formalistic perspective—as the Fumo,102 National Urological
Group,103 Asaro104 and Walia105 courts have ruled—there is thus no reason
why prosecutors may not read inmates’ unprivileged legal email.106
But as the adage goes, just because one may do something does not mean
one should. With respect to the email cases, the Ahmed court seems to have
felt this way because it forbade the prosecutor, pursuant to no clear
authority, from reading the defendant’s legal email,107 despite
acknowledging that the email was unprivileged.108 More significantly, at
least one prosecutor’s office has voluntarily employed “taint teams” to
segregate inmates’ unprivileged legal email.109 Further because there have
been just six cases, from only three jurisdictions to address a prosecutor
reading an inmate’s legal email,110 which BOP monitors at all of its
facilities nationwide,111 it is likely that other prosecutors’ offices also

99. FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294, 2012 WL 171621, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012) (“Essentially, TRULINCS requires prisoners using the system to
consent to monitoring and warns that communications with attorneys are not privileged.”);
Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 1 (stating “TRULINCS communications . . . do not qualify
for the protection of attorney-client privilege” (citing Mejia, 655 F.3d at 133–35)); Tr. of
Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 5 (“There are certainly admonitions or warnings that
communications over [TRULINCS] are not privileged.”); Walia Order, supra note 16, at 29
(“[T]he TRULINCS system does not provide for the communication of privileged
information” (citing Mejia, 655 F.3d at 133)).
100. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
101. See supra Part II.C.
102. See supra Part I.A.
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. See supra Part I.D.
105. See supra Part I.F.
106. See supra note 10.
107. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
108. See Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9. Part V discusses whether federal courts
possess the authority to regulate prosecutors in this fashion.
109. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
110. See supra Part I.
111. See TRUNLINCS Locations, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/
inmates/trulincs.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
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choose not to read inmates’ legal email.112 Accordingly, the question arises
as to whether all prosecutors, as a matter of self-regulation, should abstain
from reading inmates’ legal email, even if they may read it because it is
unprivileged.
This part addresses that question. Part III.A provides background on
prosecutorial self-regulation. Part III.B explains why some prosecutors
choose not to read inmates’ legal email. Part III.C explains the arguments
prosecutors have offered in defense of their decision to read it. Part III.D
argues that all prosecutors should abstain from reading inmate-attorney
email, even though it is unprivileged, because this behavior unjustifiably
chills confidential inmate-attorney communication.
A. Prosecutorial Self-Regulation
As the American Bar Association (ABA) writes, prosecutors are not
simply advocates but “ministers of justice.”113 Accordingly, it is their duty
to “seek justice, not merely convict.”114 This duty encompasses obvious
directives, such as refraining from prosecuting charges one knows are
unsupported.115 Perhaps surprisingly, however, another important part of
this duty is to encourage efforts to remediate “inadequacies and injustices”
prosecutors detect in “substantive and procedural law.”116
As Professor Bruce A. Green explains, the idea that a prosecutor is an
advocate and a quasi-judicial actor partly responsible for the justness of
criminal proceedings is generally explained by one of two theories:
(1) because prosecutors have great power to bring criminal charges, they
must also bear great ethical responsibility, or (2) because prosecutors
represent and serve the sovereign, they must seek to meet all of the state’s
objectives, which in the United States emphatically includes fair process.117
Regardless of what explanatory theory one accepts, prosecutors’ duty to
seek justice is a concept that appeals to many in the legal profession.118
Most importantly, as Green and Professor Fred C. Zacharias point out,
many prosecutors themselves take this notion seriously.119 With respect to
federal prosecutors, a testament to this is the degree to which they selfregulate.120 For example, on its own accord, the U.S. Department of Justice
112. The number of prosecutor’s offices that voluntarily abstain from reading inmateattorney email would be valuable data. Capturing it, however, is beyond this Note’s scope.
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2014).
114. ABA Prosecution Function Standards Standard 3–1.2(c) (2014).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2014).
116. ABA Prosecution Function Standards Standard 3–1.2(d) (2014).
117. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 625–38 (1999).
118. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty
to Support Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 983 (2014); Bennet L. Gershman,
The Zealous Prosecutor As Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151, 152 (2011); Fred
C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 49 (1991).
119. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REV. 381, 449–50 (2002).
120. Id. at 427.
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(DOJ) promulgated and maintains the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (USAM).121
The USAM is an internal set of policies that state what federal prosecutors
should and should not do.122 A recent example of DOJ issuing a policy that
barred a lawful prosecutorial practice for the sake of “enhancing due
process” is its decision to prohibit prosecutors from including ineffective
assistance of counsel waivers in plea agreements.123 In DOJ’s own words,
even though federal courts have uniformly allowed this practice, DOJ
barred it in furtherance of ensuring that the adversarial system functions
“fairly, efficiently, and responsibly.”124
In sum, there are federal prosecutors who take seriously their duty to seek
justice. Accordingly, they may voluntarily abstain from a given practice if
doing so increases fairness, even if it also decreases their ability to secure
convictions.
B. Why Some Prosecutors Choose to Abstain from Reading Inmates’ Legal
Email
At least one prosecutor’s office, and likely more, has voluntarily
employed taint teams to segregate inmates’ unprivileged legal email.125
This raises the question of why a prosecutor’s office would choose to selfregulate with respect to this issue. Though no prosecutor’s office has
answered this question, answers can be inferred from the arguments that
defendants and courts have made against prosecutors who choose to read
inmates’ legal email.
The first reason a prosecutor’s office would choose not to read inmates’
unprivileged legal email is to avoid restricting confidential attorney-client
communication. As the defendant in Walia argued, because email is now
the legal profession’s dominant communicative medium, denying inmates
the ability to communicate confidentially with counsel via email seriously
impedes their overall ability to communicate confidentially with counsel.126
Prosecutors are well aware of the value our legal system places on
121. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9 (2015), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL].
122. See, e.g., id. § 9-13.420(E) (“Conducting [a] Search . . . . [T]o protect the attorneyclient privilege . . . a ‘privilege team’ should be designated, consistent of agents and lawyers
not involved in the underlying investigation.”).
123. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces New Policy to Enhance
Justice Department’s Commitment to Support Defendant’s Right to Counsel, JUST. NEWS
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-new-policyenhance-justice-departments-commitment-suppoet.
124. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to All Federal Prosecutors, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE (Oct 14, 2014), available at http://justice.gov/sites/default/files/pressreleases/attachments/2014/10/15/dept-policy-on-waivers-of-claims-of-ineffective-assistanceof-counsel.pdf.
125. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
126. Reply to Response to Motion re: 34 First Motion in Limine re: Defendant Emails to
Counsel at 3, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014); see also
ABA LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., 2 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: LAW OFFICE
TECHNOLOGY 48 (2014) (reporting that 98.3 percent of lawyers surveyed said they use email
for law-related tasks).
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confidential attorney-client communication: there are at least three Model
Rules of Professional Conduct devoted to its furtherance,127 and the
Supreme Court proffered “full and frank” attorney-client communication as
the very behavior the attorney-client privilege is meant to promote.128 A
prosecutor’s office that chooses not to read inmates’ unprivileged legal
email is thus likely making this decision, at least in part, in recognition of
how critically important it is for a client to be able to communicate
confidentially with her attorney.
A second, related reason that a prosecutor’s office would abstain from
reading inmates’ legal email is because the office appreciates the unique
difficulties inmates face in communicating with their attorneys. As the
defendant in Walia argued and the Ahmed court opined, denying inmates
confidential legal email is particularly detrimental to their overall ability to
communicate confidentially with counsel because (1) the alternative means
of privileged communication BOP offers are inefficient, and (2) most
inmates are represented by public defenders with high caseloads and limited
resources.129 It is therefore likely that a prosecutor’s office that chooses to
abstain from reading inmates’ unprivileged legal email does so, at least in
part, in recognition of the unique difficulty inmates’ face with respect to
communicating in confidence with their attorney.
C. Why Some Prosecutors Choose to Read Inmates’ Legal Email
Prosecutors in at least three jurisdictions have chosen to read inmates’
legal email.130 Only the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of
New York, however, has provided justifications for its decision.131 As this
office explained in Ahmed, it decided to read inmate-attorney email because
it reads inmates’ personal email, and it is too expensive to segregate
inmates’ legal email from the single PDF of all an inmate’s email that BOP
provides.132 In other words, for the Eastern District of New York, the
decision to read inmate-attorney email was motivated by administrative
necessity. As the Ahmed court opined, however, it is hard to imagine that
prosecutors are not also motivated to read inmates’ legal email in order to
gain greater access to the truth.133

127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014) (enumerating attorneys’ duties
of confidentiality); id. R. 1.4 (enumerating attorneys’ duties to communicate with their
client); id. R.4.4(b) (requiring an attorney who receives inadvertently sent information
pertaining to an adverse party to notify the sender).
128. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
129. Reply to Response to Motion re: 34 First Motion in Limine re: Defendant Emails to
Counsel at 3, Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014); Tr. of Ahmed Conference,
supra note 9, at 18–21.
130. See supra Part I.
131. See supra Part I.D–F.
132. See Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 10.
133. See id. at 17.
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D. Prosecutors Should Abstain from Reading Inmate-Attorney Email
Because This Behavior Unjustifiably Chills
Inmate-Attorney Communication
From a legally formalistic perspective, prosecutors may read inmates’
legal email because it is unprivileged.134 As ministers of justice, however,
they should abstain from reading it because this behavior is normatively
disfavored within the profession, further disadvantages criminal defendants,
and lacks a compelling justification.
In recognition of the critical role communicating in confidence with
one’s attorney plays in the adversary system,135 all the actors involved in
litigating whether prosecutors can read inmates’ legal email have expressed
discomfort with them doing so: obviously, inmates and defense attorneys
are against it; more significantly, three of the four courts that ruled to allow
the practice expressed substantial misgivings about it;136 more significantly
still, until recently the government voluntarily used taint teams to manually
segregate inmates’ legal email,137 which provides the inference that the
government itself believes eavesdropping on opposing parties’ legal
communications is undesirable behavior.138 Thus, while the prosecutors
can read inmates’ legal email to better their chances of a favorable outcome,
the normative consensus among actors who have evaluated the issue,
including the government itself, is that they should refrain from doing so
because it chills defendants’ ability to communicate confidentially with
counsel.
Moreover, as recent commentators note, high rates of pretrial detention
combined with the threat of draconian mandatory minimum sentences gives
federal prosecutors nearly plenary power to extract guilty pleas from
defendants.139 This has pushed federal prosecutors dangerously close to
becoming defendants’ “inquisitors” as opposed to their adversaries.140 To
deny federal inmates and their attorneys the ability to use the dominant
communicative medium of our time to prepare their case only exacerbates
this troubling power discrepancy.
Finally, prosecutors should not read inmates’ legal email because their
decision to do so is not justified by an important legal principle or law
134. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.
135. See supra Part I.A.1.
136. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
138. Indeed, this is exactly what the government argued in Hatcher, where despite the
government claims of attorney-client privilege the court ruled to admit conversations
between the government and cooperating witnesses that took place on monitored prison
lines. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. As the First Circuit aptly has noted, “it
is disturbing to see the Justice Department change the color of its
stripes . . . portraying . . . events variously . . . depending on the strategic necessities of the
separate litigations.” United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 127 (1st Cir. 1998).
139. See David Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J.
2578, 2581 (2013) (noting that because of this combination of circumstances only 2.7
percent of federal cases went to trial in 2010 as opposed to 15 percent in 1963); see also The
Kings of The Courtroom, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2014, at 33.
140. See Patton, supra note 139, at 104.
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enforcement policy. Rather, it is an opportunistic choice that exploits a gap
between technological innovation and established norms in order to save
money.141 As the Saade court implied,142 and as common sense dictates,
because over time BOP has successively provided for confidential legal
visits, legal mail, and legal phone calls,143 it will almost certainly eventually
provide for confidential legal email. But while BOP had significant
financial incentive to provide inmates with email access,144 its only
incentive to provide confidential legal email is that it is normatively the
right thing to do. Because prisoners are an extremely weak political group,
it is unsurprising that BOP has yet to accommodate this interest. As the
ABA suggests, when prosecutors recognize this type of imbalance in the
criminal justice system they should seek to remediate it.145 At the very
least, they should not seek to exploit it.
In sum, while prosecutors can legally read inmates’ legal emails because
they are unprivileged, as ministers of justice they should refrain from doing
so as this behavior is disfavored within the profession because it chills
inmate-attorney communication, further disadvantages inmates, and can be
explained as a choice to save money by exploiting the fact that BOP has yet
to apply its established norms to new technology.
IV. ARE INMATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICTED
WHEN PROSECUTORS READ THEIR LEGAL EMAIL?
Part II argues that inmates’ legal emails are unprivileged but that
prosecutors should nevertheless refrain from reading them. Parts IV and V
discuss the arguments defendants have made against prosecutors who
choose to read their legal email.
This part discusses whether or not prosecutors reading inmates’ legal
email is unconstitutional. Part IV.A provides background regarding
inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel which defendants
have argued prosecutors impermissibly restrict by reading their legal email.
Part IV.B explains the different standards of review courts employ when
assessing whether a given action or a prison policy impermissibly restricts
this right. Part IV.C notes that all courts have rejected the defendants’
constitutional arguments. Part IV.D asserts, however, that defendants’
constitutional claims have been unsuccessful because they have argued that
the individual prosecutors’ acts of reading their legal email, as opposed to
BOP’s email monitoring policy, impermissibly restricts their constitutional
rights. In contrast with claiming that an act restricts an inmate’s
141. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
144. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, TRUST FUND LIMITED INMATE COMPUTER SYSTEM
(TRULINCS) ELECTRONIC MESSAGING 1 (2009), available at http://www.bop.gov/
policy/progstat/5265_013.pdf (describing program objectives as “[t]o provide the Bureau
with a more efficient, cost-effective, and secure method of managing and monitoring inmate
communications services” and “[t]o reduce opportunities for . . . contraband to be introduced
into Bureau facilities through inmate mail”).
145. ABA Prosecution Function Standards Standard 3–1.2(d) (2014).
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constitutional rights, Part IV.D concludes constitutional challenges to
prison regulations require courts to apply specific, stricter standards of
review, under which BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts
inmates’ right of access to counsel.
A. Inmates’ Sixth Amendment Right of Access to Counsel
As the Supreme Court has proclaimed, “[p]rison walls do not form a
Two
barrier” between inmates and constitutional protections.146
constitutional protections inmates retain are the Sixth Amendment right of
access to counsel and the right of access to the courts.147 In the email cases,
defendants have argued, thus far unsuccessfully, that even if their legal
email is unprivileged, prosecutors cannot read it because doing so
impermissibly restricts these rights.148
By its plain text, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an individual accused
of a federal crime the right “to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.”149 In Douglas v. California,150 this right was extended to appeals
as of right,151 in Massiah v. United States152 the Court recognized the
special importance of legal assistance during pretrial proceedings,153 and in
Strickland v. Washington154 the Court explained that assistance of counsel
means “reasonably effective” assistance.155 For pretrial detainees, convicts
appealing as of right, and the small percentage of convicts able to retain
private counsel,156 reasonably effective assistance has been interpreted to
guarantee at least the right to meet with their attorney in a confidential
setting.157 At BOP facilities, inmates are entitled to confidential legal
visits,158 physical mail,159 and phone calls.160
146. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
147. See generally 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, §§ 12:1, 12:24 (4th ed.
2014) (subscription required).
148. See infra Part I.C.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right was reaffirmed in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 459 (1938). The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of assistance of counsel was extended
to defendants in state courts in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
150. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
151. An appeal as of right, as opposed to by permission, is an appeal a party is statutorily
entitled to and an appellate court must hear. Compare FED. R. APP. P. 3 (“Appeal As of
Right”), with FED. R. APP. P. 5 (“Appeal by Permission”).
152. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
153. Id. at 205 (calling arraignment through trial “perhaps the most critical period of the
proceedings” (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932))).
154. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
155. Id. at 687.
156. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 8 (2009), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf (noting that only 21 percent of federal
defendants retained private counsel). BOP inmates are entitled to retain private counsel at
any time. See 28 C.F.R. § 543.12 (2012).
157. 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 12:27.
158. 28 C.F.R § 543.13(b) (“The Warden generally may not limit the frequency of
attorney visits . . . [which are to] take place in a private conference room, if available . . . .”).
159. Id. § 540.18(a) (2012) (“The Warden shall open . . . special mail only in the presence
of the inmate for inspection of . . . contraband . . . . The correspondence may not be read.”).
160. See id. § 540.102l; supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Convicted inmates unable to retain private counsel, who have neither the
right of access to counsel nor the right to appeal, are thus not cutoff from
the justice system; they retain the related “fundamental” constitutional right
of access to the courts, which requires prisons to provide for, and ensure
they do not impermissibly impede, inmates’ ability to bring non-frivolous
legal claims.161
B. Judicial Review of Prison Regulations
That Restrict Inmates’ Constitutional Rights
Because prisoners retain constitutional protections, when a given action
or prison policy threatens an inmate’s constitutional guarantee, federal
courts will “discharge their duty” to protect it.162 As of publication,
defendants have not challenged the constitutionality of BOP’s email
monitoring policy; instead, they have, thus far unsuccessfully, argued on a
case-by-case basis that the prosecutor’s act of reading their legal email
impermissibly restricts their right of access to counsel.163
Federal courts assess whether an action impermissibly restricts an
inmate’s constitutional right by ascertaining the degree to which the action
restricted the inmate’s overall ability to exercise the right.164 Barring a
particularly egregious incident, inmates’ constitutional claims are generally
dismissed.165
In contrast with actions that restrict inmates’ constitutional rights, prison
policies that do so are subject to specific, stricter standards of review.166
161. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977); see, e.g., Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d
1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts
requires that incoming legal mail from his attorneys . . . may be opened only in the inmate’s
presence and only to inspect for contraband.”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996)
(affirming prisoners’ right of access to the courts as mandating an adequate library or
adequate assistance from persons trained in law); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419
(1974) (holding that a prison policy barring law students and legal paraprofessionals from
visiting prisoners unjustifiably restricted inmates’ right of access to the courts). See
generally 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 12.
162. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 406.
163. See infra Part III.C.
164. These cases are relatively uncommon and are not decided pursuant to a consistent
standard of review. See, e.g., Zavala v. Rios, No. 1:09-CV-00679-BAM PC, 2012 WL
1592544, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (finding no constitutional violation of an inmate’s
right to communicate with his attorney when a prison guard failed to return several of the
attorney’s phone calls); Schick v. Apker, No. 07CIV.57775SHS, 2009 WL 2016926, at *2–3
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009) (finding no constitutional violation of an inmate’s right of access to
counsel where he was denied unmonitored phone calls on three occasions); Hall v. McLesky,
83 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding no violation of inmate’s right of access
to counsel where the inmate was temporarily unable to call his attorney because the prison
administration was slow in placing the attorney’s name on the approved call list). But see In
re Roark, 56 Cal Rptr. 2d 582, 589 (1996) (holding that prison officials impermissibly
restricted the defendant’s right of access to counsel where they required the removal and
search of his attorney’s prosthetic leg prior to visitation, which the attorney refused to
comply with); but see also Tucker v. Randall 948 F.2d 388, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that denying a pretrial detainee telephone access for four days may be unconstitutional).
165. See supra note 164.
166. See generally 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 2:3.
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Today, Turner v. Safely167 generally governs cases in which a prison
policy’s constitutionality is at issue.168 In Turner, the Court ruled that a
prison regulation limiting inmates’ ability to correspond with one another
did not impermissibly restrict their First Amendment right to free speech,
but that a regulation requiring inmates to obtain the prison superintendent’s
permission prior to marrying did impermissibly restrict their right to
marry.169
The Turner Court announced that when a prison policy restricts inmates’
constitutional rights, it is valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.”170 In performing this rational basis review, the
Court furthered, it is necessary to consider: (1) whether there is a “rational
connection” between the regulation and governmental interest, (2) whether
there are “alternative means” for the inmates to exercise the restricted right,
(3) the effect accommodating the right will have on prison interests and
resources, and (4) whether inmates can point to a low-cost alternative to the
regulation.171 The Supreme Court has not provided guidance as to the
relative weight of each factor, and lower courts have afforded factors more
or less importance depending on a given case’s facts.172
Turner does not, however, govern all cases in which a defendant claims
that a prison policy impermissibly restricts her constitutional rights.173 The
court did not apply Turner, for example, in Benjamin v. Fraser,174 a case
167. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
168. See Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (“[I]n Turner we adopted a
unitary . . . standard for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims.”); 3 MUSHLIN, supra
note 149, § 2.4 (“The four-part Turner v. Safely test . . . has become the default test to use in
great many prison cases.”). But see Michael Keegan, The Supreme Court’s “Prisoner
Dilemma”: How Johnson, RLUIPA, and Cutter Re-defined Inmate Constitutional Claims, 86
NEB. L. REV. 279 (2007) (analyzing recent departures from Turner); Trevor N. McFadden,
When To Turn To Turner? The Supreme Court’s Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22
J.L. & POL. 135 (2006) (also analyzing recent departures from Turner).
169. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. The right to marry is protected under Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
170. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Courts have recognized legitimate penological interests as
those related to maintaining security, providing for rehabilitation, and conserving resources.
See 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 12.
171. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The Court reasoned that regulating correspondence was
reasonably related to institutional security, and monitoring all communications would be
unreasonably burdensome. Id. at 98. By contrast, the Court reasoned that requiring
permission to marry was unrelated to security and prison marriages can be overseen at nearly
no cost. Id.; see also, e.g., Clement v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr. 364 F.3d. 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding policy banning inmates’ receipt of internet-generated material
unconstitutional under Turner). But see Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 533 (2006)
(upholding prison regulation under Turner that restricted access to newspapers, magazines,
and photographs for inmates housed in prison’s most restricted level).
172. See 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 2:9.
173. See, e.g., Demery v. Arpaoi, 378 F.3d 1020, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2004) (refusing to
apply Turner in case concerning pretrial detainees as opposed to convicts). See generally
Keegan, supra note 168; McFadden supra, note 168. Most recently the court explained that
Turner applies only to rights that need “necessarily be compromised” for proper prison
administration, such as restrictions on access to the counsel. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 510 (2005). By contrast, Turner would not apply to the right not to be discriminated
against based on one’s race. Id. at 510–11.
174. 264 F.3d 175 (2d. Cir 2001).
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courts in the email cases have relied on in holding that prosecutors reading
inmates’ legal email does not impermissibly restrict their right of access to
counsel.175 In Benjamin, the defendants, who were pretrial detainees,
challenged several prison policies that caused extensive delays for their
attorneys trying to visit them.176 Defendants brought suit against the
prison, claiming that its delay-causing policies infringed their right of
access to counsel and access to the courts.177
Though the Benjamin court stated that it believed the prison policies
would fail under Turner,178 it chose to apply the more inmate-friendly
“unjustifiably obstructs” standard articulated in Procunier v. Martinez.179
In addition, the court applied a standard specifically for pretrial detainees
set out in Bell v. Wolfish,180 which states that regulations restricting pretrial
detainees’ constitutional rights must be evaluated only in light of prison
administrations’ central objective, namely, “safeguarding institutional
security.”181 The court reasoned that Turner was inapposite and Procunier
and Wolfish controlled because the case involved (1) pretrial detainees (at
issue in Wolfish) and (2) a regulation restricting inmates’ access to counsel
(at issue in Procunier), neither of which Turner addressed.182 Pursuant to
this analysis, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the prison’s
delay-causing policies unjustifiably obstructed the defendants’ right of
access to counsel.183
The Benjamin court noted that the prison’s policies implicated
defendants’ right of access to counsel and access to the courts, but it made a
point to differentiate the two.184 The difference is meaningful because in
Lewis v. Casey185 the Supreme Court held that prisoners bringing an access

175. See infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. As Part III.B argues, however, these
holdings are predicated on a misreading of Benjamin that the government proffered and the
courts adopted uncritically. See infra notes 207–14 and accompanying text.
176. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 179. These policies included maintaining a small number of
counsel rooms and refusing to bring pretrial detainees to counsel rooms during inmate counts
or without special escort officers. Id.
177. Id. at 180.
178. Id. at 187 n.10.
179. 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (“[Prison] [r]egulations and practices that unjustifiably
obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access
to the courts are invalid.”).
180. 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
181. Id. This stands in contrast to Turner, which allows a court to evaluate a prison
policy in relation to any legitimate penological interest. See supra note 170 and
accompanying text.
182. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 187 n.10. The Court argued that Turner is inapposite in cases
involving pretrial detainees because it involved convicted prisoners and promulgated a
standard predicated on penological interests, which a state does not have with respect to
persons merely accused of a crime. Id.
183. Id. at 190.
184. Id. at 186 (“[T]he right to counsel and the right of access to the courts are
interrelated, since the provision of counsel can be a means of accessing the courts. However,
the two rights are not the same.”).
185. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
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to the courts claim must show “actual injury” to have standing.186 Though
it is arguable as to whether Lewis’s actual injury requirement applies to
access to counsel claims,187 the Benjamin court held that it does not because
access to counsel, unlike access to the courts, is a right that the Constitution
directly guarantees.188
C. Courts Have Not Found That Prosecutors Reading Legal Email
Is Unconstitutional
In National Urological Group, Asaro, Ahmed, and Walia, the defendants
argued that, regardless of whether their legal emails are privileged, the
government’s decision to read them impermissibly restricts their Sixth
Amendment right of access to counsel.189 In National Urological Group,
citing Al-Amin v. Smith,190 the defendant argued additionally that this
behavior violated his right of access to the courts.191 The National
Urological Group court ignored the access to the courts claim and
dismissed the access to counsel claim because, it held the Sixth Amendment
does not apply in a civil contempt proceeding.192 In Ahmed, despite barring
the government from reading the defendant’s legal emails,193 the court
never addressed his access to counsel claim.194 This issue, however, was
given significant attention by the Asaro and Walia courts.195 Both courts
acknowledged the burden that the inability to send privileged email places
on inmates’ ability to consult their counsel.196 The courts held, however,
that under Benjamin,197 because BOP facilities provide for alternative

186. Id. at 351 (“Insofar as [access to the courts] is concerned . . . the inmate must
demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered
his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”).
187. See 3 MUSHLIN, supra note 147, § 12:23.
188. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 186; see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting the Courts historic inability to “agree upon the constitutional source” of the right of
access to the courts). As Part III.B argues, the burden of having to prove actual injury makes
it unlikely that a challenge to BOP’s email monitoring policy under an access to the courts
theory would succeed.
189. FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012); Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Irizarry Letter, supra note 53, at
2; Walia Order supra note 16, at 29–30. No constitutional claims were raised in Fumo or
Saade.
190. 511 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2008).
191. Cross Motion to Dismiss the Charges or Motion to Disqualify the F.T.C. Trial Team
at 4, Nat’l Urological Grp., No. 1:04-CV-03294 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2011).
192. Nat’l Urological Grp., 2012 WL 171621, at *1. This dismissal was arguably
improper. See infra note 200.
193. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21.
194. See generally id.
195. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at 29–30.
196. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2 (“[T]he court sympathizes with [defendant and
defense counsel’s] concern that it would . . . be more efficient . . . if their . . . defense
preparation could be conducted through privilege-protected emails.”); Walia Order, supra
note 16, at 29 (“[T]he Court understands and appreciates Defendant’s desire to have quick
and easy access to his counsel by email.”).
197. See supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text.
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modes of confidential communication, the defendants’ right of access to
counsel were not “unreasonably burdened.”198
D. BOP’s Email Monitoring Policy Impermissibly Restricts
Inmates’ Right of Access to Counsel
In the email cases, the defendants’ constitutional arguments claimed only
that the prosecutors’ behavior, as opposed to BOP’s email monitoring
policy, restricted their right of access to counsel.199 The National
Urological Group court dismissed this claim under the theory that the Sixth
Amendment “does not apply” in civil contempt cases.200 The Ahmed court
did not respond to the defendant’s access to counsel claim,201 and the Asaro
and Walia courts, while devoting significant discussion to the defendants’
access to counsel claims, ultimately rejected them.202
In the email cases, the defendants’ constitutional arguments have failed
because they challenged an action that BOP’s email monitoring policy
made possible—i.e., the prosecutor reading the defendants’ legal email—as
opposed to challenging the policy itself. As Asaro and Walia illustrate,
courts assess whether an action unconstitutionally restricts an inmate’s
constitutional rights by, rather amorphously, comparing the degree to which
By contrast,
the event inhibited her ability to exercise them.203
constitutional challenges to prison regulations require courts to apply
specific, stricter standards of review,204 under which BOP’s email
monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts inmates’ right of access to
counsel.
The Asaro court, citing Benjamin, ruled that because BOP offers other
means of privileged legal communication, its failure to provide privileged
email did not unreasonably burden the defendant’s right of access to
counsel.205
This ruling is confusing because the defendant never
challenged BOP’s email monitoring policy.206 In addition, this ruling is
predicated on a plain misreading of Benjamin that the government
198. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30. In so holding,
both courts, arguably, adopted a misreading of Benjamin that the government proffered. See
infra notes 207–14 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part IV.C. In National Urological Group, the defendant also argued that
the government’s behavior impinged his right of access to the courts, which the court
ignored. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. This dismissal was arguably improper.
While the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee counsel in civil contempt proceedings,
inmates have the derivative right of access to counsel if they retain an attorney. See supra
notes 156–59 and accompanying text. Because assistance of counsel in civil contempt
proceedings is not directly guaranteed by the constitution, it is likely that the defendant
would have the added burden of proving actual injury. See supra notes 185–88. This does
not mean, however, that the right does not apply.
201. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 167–88 and accompanying text.
205. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2.
206. DiFiore Letter, supra note 44, at 3 (only arguing that the “government’s decision to
read our communications with [the defendant] . . . will frustrate [his] access of counsel”).
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proffered.207 The Benjamin court stated that it was applying Procunier and
Bell.208 It merely referred to “unreasonably burdens” as a “similar
standard” it had adopted in the past and it never mentioned an alternative
means test.209 The Asaro court thus misguidedly ruled on BOP’s email
monitoring policy’s constitutionality pursuant to a standard of review,
which the government derived from a misreading of Benjamin, that was
intended to respond to the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s
behavior—not BOP’s email monitoring policy—restricted his right of
access to counsel.210
In Walia, the government submitted the Asaro ruling,211 and the court
rejected the defendant’s access to counsel claim pursuant to its logic.212
The court framed its ruling, however, with respect to the prosecutor
reviewing the defendant’s legal email; it made no reference to BOP’s email
monitoring policy.213 Thus, though the Walia court employed the same
misreading of Benjamin that the Asaro court did, its result was more
reasonable because the alternative means test it employed accords with
analyses other courts have used to assess whether an individual act, or set of
acts, impermissibly restricts an inmate’s constitutional rights.214
In order to avoid the confusing, unfavorable results Walia and Asaro
represent, future defendants should explicitly argue that BOP’s email
monitoring policy unconstitutionally restricts their right of access to
counsel. This clearly should prompt courts to apply either the four-part
Turner test,215 or an appropriate alternative, such as Procunier216 and its
progeny, which include Benjamin. Whether a court would apply one or the
other in a given Sixth Amendment challenge to BOP’s email monitoring
policy is arguable.217 For this Note’s purposes, however, the question is
moot because BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts
inmates’ right of access to counsel under either standard.
207. Letter Responding in Opposition to the Defendant’s Application at 4, United States
v. Asaro, No. 1:14-cr-00026 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014) (“[D]efendant’s Sixth Amendment
argument fails because, to the extent the government’s review of TRULINCS emails at all
deters [him] from using that mode of communication . . . that inconvenience does not
unreasonably interfere with [his] ability to consult his attorney . . . in light of the other
methods of attorney-client communication available” (citing Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d
175, 185 (2d Cir. 2001))).
208. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 187 ; see supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text.
209. Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 187.
210. For a discussion of courts improperly upholding prison regulations pursuant only to
an alternative means test, see Peter R. Shults, Note, Calling the Supreme Court: Prisoners’
Constitutional Right to Telephone Use, 92 B.U. L. REV. 369, 385 (2012).
211. Letter re: Supplemental Authority As to Tushar Walia, United States v. Walia, No.
1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014).
212. Compare id., with Walia Order, supra note 16, at 29–30.
213. Walia Order, supra note 16, at 29–30.
214. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 168–72.
216. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
217. The Court has referred to Turner as a unitary standard. See supra note 168 and
accompanying text. As the Benjamin court held, however, Turner is arguably inapposite in
cases where the rights of pretrial detainees are at issue because it concerned convicted
prisoners. See supra note 182.
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In contrast to the Asaro court’s holding, a proper analysis of a prison
regulation under Benjamin asks if a prison policy “unjustifiably obstructs”
the availability of pretrial detainees’ representation. This inquiry analyzes
this question only in relation to prison administrations’ central objective,
“safeguarding institutional security.”218 BOP’s email monitoring policy
fails this test. As the defense attorneys in Walia rightly observe, in today’s
American legal profession, email is how business is done.219 In addition,
for anyone working with an attorney, the ability to communicate
confidentially is paramount.220 Denying pretrial detainees confidential
legal email thus plainly obstructs their representation’s availability.221
Further, security concerns cannot justify this obstruction. BOP cannot say
it views confidential inmate-attorney communication as a security threat
because BOP allows inmates to communicate confidentially with counsel
via every other communicative media that it offers.222 There is nothing
unique about email to warrant making it the first exception to this rule. In
fact, per BOP’s own reasoning, confidential email is safer than confidential
legal visits or confidential physical mail because one cannot smuggle
contraband via email.223 Thus, under Benjamin’s application of Procunier
and Bell, because BOP’s email monitoring policy obstructs the availability
of pretrial detainees’ attorneys, and because this obstruction is not
justifiable as a security measure, it impermissibly restricts pretrial
detainees’ right of access to counsel.
If a court chose to apply the four-part Turner test224 in considering
whether BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly restricts inmates’
right of access to counsel, it would reach the same result. Though BOP has
never had occasion to state in a legal proceeding what their interest is in
monitoring inmates’ email communication, it is presumably the same
interest it has in monitoring phone calls and physical mail—i.e.,
maintaining institutional security.225 Maintaining institutional security is a
legitimate penological interest under Turner.226 With respect to the first
factor, a court would almost certainly find monitoring inmates’ emails
rationally related to maintaining institutional security. In addition, the
218. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
219. Reply to Response to Motion re: 34 First Motion in Limine re: Defendant Emails to
Counsel at 3, United States v. Walia, No. 1:14-cr-00213 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014); see also
ABA LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR, supra note 126.
220. See supra Part I.A.1.
221. This obstruction is exacerbated by the fact that, as the Ahmed court stated, it can be
exceedingly difficult to arrange for in-person legal visits or unmonitored phone calls and
communicating via physical mail is not a viable option in preparing a case. See supra note
293.
222. See supra notes 158–59.
223. See supra note 144.
224. See supra notes 170–71.
225. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1
(2008), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5264_008.pdf (noting the
institutional interest in security as the reason for inmate phone call monitoring); FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, BOP PROGRAM STATEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 8 (2011), available
at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5265_014.pdf (same with respect to physical mail).
226. See supra note 170.
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second factor also favors BOP because inmates have alternative means of
exercising their right to communicate confidentially with counsel.227
Nevertheless, with respect to the third factor, far from having a negative
effect on institutional security or prison resources, providing inmates
confidential legal email would benefit each. As BOP states, it provided
inmates email to limit the risk of incoming contraband and to ease the
administrative burden that arranging for phone calls and in-person visits
creates.228 Enabling inmates to communicate confidentially with counsel
via email would further both these goals. Finally, with respect to the fourth
factor, as the Ahmed court opined, any casual user of Google Mail would
find it difficult to imagine that BOP could not, at a low cost, simply add a
feature to TRULINCS that filtered emails to and from inmates’ attorneys of
record.229
It is true that monitoring inmate communication is rationally related to
BOP’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining institutional security,
and inmates have other means by which to communicate confidentially with
counsel. However because providing for confidential legal email would
have a positive effect on institutional security and prison resources (and
likely it would be easy to provide), BOP’s email monitoring policy
impermissibly restricts inmates’ right of access to counsel under Turner.
V. CAN FEDERAL COURTS PREVENT PROSECUTORS FROM READING
INMATES’ LEGAL EMAIL ON NON-CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS?
Part IV.D argues that BOP’s email monitoring policy impermissibly
restricts inmates’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel. In the email
cases, however, BOP’s email monitoring policy was not at issue.230 In
future litigations, this is likely to remain the case because busy defense
attorneys probably will continue to make case-by-case arguments regarding
individual prosecutor’s behavior rather than invest the resources in bringing
a challenge against BOP. Moreover, in general, federal courts seek to avoid
deciding issues on constitutional grounds where possible.231 According to
this principle of judicial restraint courts often choose not to address
constitutional issues that have not been explicitly raised by the appropriate

227. See supra notes 158–59.
228. See supra note 144.
229. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 11–12.
230. See supra note 199.
231. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (noting the “longstanding
principle of judicial restraint [which] requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them” (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988))). See generally 12B JOHN J.
DVORSKE, TEXAS JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12 (3d. ed. 2014) (subscription
required) (“A court will not determine a constitutional question unnecessarily or in a case
that does not present the question with sufficient clarity.”); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1004–05 (1994) (noting that this principal is
motivated by concerns “regarding federal courts’ credibility, the final . . . nature of judicial
review . . . the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication . . . [and] maintaining
appropriate separation of powers”).
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parties.232 Thus even if a defense attorney challenged BOP’s email
monitoring policy, a court would likely hesitate to rule on the issue if BOP
was not a party, or it felt it had an alternative ground upon which to decide
the case.
The question thus arises: Where the constitutionality of BOP’s email
monitoring policy is not properly at issue, or a court does not want to decide
it, is there a legitimate alternative ground upon which a court can prevent a
prosecutor from reading a defendant’s legal email?
Part V explains that federal courts can negate the effects of a
constitutionally questionable prosecutorial practice, without rendering a
constitutional decision, by exercising their power to regulate prosecutors’
behavior. Part V.A provides background on delegated and non-delegated
versions of these powers. Part V.B notes that three defendants in the email
cases appealed to the courts to use non-delegated variants of this power to
prevent prosecutors from reading their legal email. The courts, however,
rejected these petitions, concluding instead that they lacked the legal basis
to prevent the prosecutor from doing so. Two courts, however, sua sponte,
implicitly employed a non-delegated variant of this power to rule in the
defendants favor.233 Thus, Part V.B observes, either the four former courts
were incorrect or the two latter courts exceeded their authority.
Part V.C asserts that the two courts that implicitly employed their nondelegated power to regulate prosecutors in order to prevent them from
reading the defendant’s legal email acted within their authority. Part V.C
argues, however, that future courts should prevent prosecutors from reading
inmates’ legal email pursuant to their delegated authority to enforce Rules
of Professional Conduct. This is because explicit rulings pursuant to
delegated authority raise less separation of powers concerns and have more
precedential value as compared to implicit rulings pursuant to nondelegated authority. Specifically, Part V concludes courts should prevent
prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email by enforcing Rule 8.4(d),
which prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.234
A. Delegated and Non-Delegated Powers
Federal Courts Use to Regulate Prosecutors
Unlike state courts, which adopt professional conduct codes,235 federal
courts have no uniform approach to regulating prosecutors’ behavior.236

232. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate Lawyers:
A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1326 n.91 (2003); see also, e.g.,
Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30 n.1 (noting that the defendant’s proposed solution to create
an inmate-attorney email filter on TRULINCS was reasonable but refusing to further discuss
it because BOP was not a party to the litigation).
233. See infra Part II.C.
234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2014).
235. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2014).
236. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REV. 381, 400 (2002); see also Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules:

2015]

MONITORING INMATE-ATTORNEY EMAIL

2159

They nevertheless routinely do so by enforcing established rules of
procedure237 or utilizing rulemaking authority Congress explicitly granted
In addition, federal courts can enforce the McDade
them.238
Amendment,239 a federal statute authorizing them to apply state ethics rules
to regulate prosecutorial conduct, even if it is otherwise lawful.240 As
Professors Zacharias and Green note, when courts exercise their delegated
powers to regulate prosecutors, it is relatively uncontroversial, because their
authority to do so is apparent.241 As Zacharias and Green further note,
however, federal courts also regulate prosecutors pursuant to forms of nondelegated authority, including setting standards of conduct “indirectly”(i.e.
informally during proceedings)242 and using their “inherent authority” to
control their own proceedings243 and “supervisory authority” over the
administration of the criminal justice system.244 When federal courts
exercise these powers, it is more controversial because it is unclear whether
they truly posses them and, if they do, what their scope is.245

Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 6 (2005) (“No
single set of rules govern attorney conduct (i.e. ethics) in federal court practice.”).
237. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (authorizing federal courts to sanction federal
prosecutors for improper pleadings).
238. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012) (allowing district courts to prescribe “rules of
practice and procedure”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (authorizing federal courts to promulgate local
court rules for criminal proceedings); United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D.
Ill. 1974) (recognizing discretionary assignment and transfer of cases as proper exercise of
district courts’ authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 57).
239. 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
240. See, e.g., E. & W. Districts of Ky. v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 144 (Ky.
2014). This case applied a state ethics opinion pursuant to the McDade Amendment to bar
prosecutors from including ineffective assistance of counsel waivers in plea agreements
despite federal courts’ “nearly unanimous” opinion that it is legal to do so. Id. The ethics
rule the court adopted was a “formal opinion,” issued by the Kentucky Bar Association,
which held that this practice violated Kentucky’s professional conduct rule prohibiting
conflicts of interest. K.Y. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2014). The formal opinion
reasoned that a defense attorney advising a client to accept a plea that includes a waiver of
his right to appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel is inherently conflicted. Ky. Bar
Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 144.
241. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1310.
242. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 401–02.
243. Id. at 407 (citing Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32,34–35 (1991) (affirming federal
courts “inherent power” to, inter alia, sanction attorneys’ bad faith conduct, control
admission to the bar, punish for contempt, and vacate judgments upon discovery of fraud)).
244. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1314. See generally John Gleeson,
Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the Supervisory Powers of
Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 423 (1997); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory
Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984). Green and Zacharias also note as nondelegated sources of judicial authority “the authority of the federal courts to control the
admission of lawyers to practice before them” and “the inherent authority of federal courts to
protect their own jurisdiction.” Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1310–14. These two
sources of federal courts’ authority to regulate prosecutors are beyond this Note’s scope.
245. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1308–14.
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1. The Delegated Authority of Federal Courts to Regulate Prosecutors
Through the Rules of Professional Conduct
Congress has delegated general rulemaking authority to federal courts.246
Pursuant to this authority, federal courts promulgate “local rules” to
regulate attorney conduct.247 The vast majority of district courts adopt the
Rules of Professional Conduct that the state in which they sit employs,
which typically reflect the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.248
In addition, in 2000, in the wake of scandals surrounding federal
prosecutors’ attempts to exempt themselves from state Rules of
Professional Conduct, Congress enacted the McDade Amendment.249 It is
titled “Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government” and states that
federal prosecutors will be “subject to State laws and rules and local Federal
court rules,” wherever they practice.250 After the McDade Amendment,
even if a district court has not adopted a state rule of professional conduct
as one of its local rules, it can still enforce any rule of professional conduct
adopted by the state in which it sits.251
One question that Zacharias and Green raise, and that is relevant to this
Note, is how a federal court should proceed when it believes a prosecutor’s
behavior is plainly wrong but no local rule, state rule of professional
conduct, or any other authority specifically proscribes it.252 This is the case
in the email cases.253 One option for courts in this situation is to broadly
interpret a vague rule of professional conduct such as 8.4(d), which
prohibits lawyers from engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”254 Lower courts’ interpretations of vague Rules
246. See supra notes 237–38.
247. 30 COQUILLETTE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 802.01 (3d ed. 2014).
248. Id. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2014).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012). Congressman Joseph McDade, who was indicted in 1992
on five counts of bribery-related charges and eventually acquitted of them all, introduced the
legislation. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88
GEO. L.J. 207, 211 (2000). During his criminal proceedings, McDade filed numerous
motions alleging prosecutorial violations of ethics standards. Id. at 212. Roughly
contemporaneously to McDade’s criminal proceedings, then-Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh circulated an internal Department of Justice memorandum that ostensibly held
Department of Justice attorneys exempt from certain ethics rules adopted by several states.
Richard L. Thornburgh, Memorandum from Attorney General to all Justice Department
Litigators 1 (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992).
250. 28 U.S.C. § 530B; see, e.g., United States v. Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d 485, 496
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (analyzing prosecutors behavior under New York Rule of Professional
Conduct 4.2(a) pursuant to the McDade Amendment).
251. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 418.
252. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1306.
253. The rule of professional conduct that comes closest to specifically covering the
scenario the email cases present is Rule 4.4(b), which provides that a lawyer who
inadvertently receives a document from the opposing party shall notify the sender. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b). This rule does not apply, however, because BOP
advertently sends inmates’ legal emails to the government. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
254. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 394. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
8.4(d); see, e.g., United States v. Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. 368, 370 (E.D. Pa.), rev’d, 268 F.3d
185 (3d Cir. 2001) (pursuant to the McDade Amendment, district court disqualified
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of Professional Conduct, however, can be perceived as inappropriately
exploiting the rules’ open-textured language to give effect to idiosyncratic
judicial preferences.255 To this end, in analyzing lower court applications
of Rules of Professional Conduct, a threshold question that has arisen is
whether or not the court is enforcing a true “ethics rules,” as opposed to
effectuating a policy choice.256 The Tenth Circuit argues that ethics rules
(1) address conduct the legal profession consensually deems inappropriate
and (2) are directed specifically at attorneys.257 Zacharias and Green
suggest that ethics rules (1) apply to all lawyers (because rules that apply
only to a subclass of lawyers are too likely to implicate policy choices) and
(2) primarily impact lawyers as opposed to institutions.258
2. Non-Delegated Authority Federal Courts Use to Regulate Prosecutors
For a federal court seeking to control a prosecutor’s behavior where no
local rule, state rule of professional conduct, or any other authority
specifically proscribes it, an alternative to interpreting a vague rule of
professional conduct is to act pursuant to one of the non-delegated powers
federal courts have historically employed to regulate prosecutors’
behavior.259 These include their ability to set standards indirectly,260 their
inherent authority over their own proceedings,261 and their supervisory
power over the administration of the criminal justice system.262
a. Indirect Standard Setting
As Zacharias and Green note, the most common way federal courts
regulate prosecutorial behavior is by “setting standards indirectly,” or
making ad hoc decisions throughout the litigation process that communicate
the court’s view of appropriate conduct.263 These decisions may be
memorialized in a written opinion, appear on the record as oral

prosecutor for violating Pennsylvania ethics rule 8.4(d) where the prosecutor sent extremely
confusing letters to the defendant regarding whether he was or was not a crime suspect);
Grievance Adm’r v. Fried, 570 N.W.2d 262, 267 & n.11, 267–68 (Mich. 1997) (finding Rule
8.4(d) applicable where lawyer hired judge’s relative to work on a case to force the judge’s
recusal).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing
district court’s interpretation of Rule 8.4(d) because it was “unjustified”).
256. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1332.
257. United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999).
258. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1333.
259. Id. at 1310–15.
260. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 401–03.
261. Id. at 407–08.
262. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 411–12.
263. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 401–03; see, e.g., United States v. Sabri, 973
F. Supp. 134, 146 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (suppressing evidence of a conversation based on a
violation of an ethics rule); United States v. Bazan, 807 F.2d 1200, 1204 (5th Cir. 1986)
(approving district court’s sustaining of objections to prosecutors’ cross examination);
United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 458, 461 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming district
court’s striking of the prosecutor’s improper remarks).
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admonitions, or remain unrecorded.264 Though regulating prosecutors in
this fashion can be effective, as Zacharias and Green point out, it is unclear
what authority courts act pursuant to when doing so; in turn, because
federal prosecutors exercise executive discretion, the prospect of courts
constraining their behavior pursuant to no clear authority raises acute
separation of powers concerns.265 In the email cases, both courts that
prevented prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email did so by issuing
oral admonitions, pursuant to no clear authority, at pretrial hearings.266
b. Inherent Judicial Authority over Their Own Proceedings
Several defense attorneys in the email cases have unsuccessfully
petitioned the courts to prevent prosecutors from reading their clients’ legal
emails by exercising their inherent authority to control their own
proceedings.267 As Zacharias and Green point out, while this source of
non-delegated authority is widely recognized, it is generally narrowly
employed to punish lawyer activity that threatens a court’s efficient
operations,268 such as bad faith conduct269 or tardiness.270
c. Supervisory Authority over the Administration
of the Criminal Justice System
The Supreme Court has long recognized federal courts’ power to regulate
prosecutors’ behavior pursuant to their “supervisory authority over the
administration of criminal justice.”271 As Zacharias and Green note,
however, this power’s scope has been subject to much judicial and

264. Zacharias & Green, supra note 236, at 402.
265. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1313–14. Professors Zacharias and Green
suggest that when federal courts are silent as to the authority pursuant to which they are
controlling lawyers’ behavior, they may believe they are exercising what some courts have
called a “general ethics authority.” Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1313–14 (citing
Weibrecht v. S. Ill. Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district
courts’ “inherent power and responsibility to supervise the conduct of attorneys admitted to
practice before it.”)); Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349,
1356 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing district court’s inherent power to “erec[t] reasonable
prophylactic rules to regulate perceived abuses by attorneys appearing before the court”).
266. See infra notes 287–92 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 282–83 and accompanying text. In the two cases where the court
prevented prosecutors from reading the defendant’s legal email, defense counsel made no
reference to courts’ non-delegated authority to regulate prosecutors. See infra notes 287–92
and accompanying text.
268. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1342.
269. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (affirming district court’s use
of its “inherent power” to shift attorneys’ fees because a litigant filed frivolous pleadings and
thereby delayed the proceeding).
270. United States v. Seltzer, 127 F. Supp. 2d 172, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (sanctioning an
attorney for tardiness pursuant to the court’s “inherent power to manage and control” its own
proceedings).
271. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 349 (1943); see also United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992); Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
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scholarly scrutiny.272 In McNabb v. United States,273 the Court stated that
the power should be used to “maintain[] civilized standards of procedure
and evidence,” and exercised it to exclude confessions obtained coercively
though not illegally.274 As commentators argue, however, McNabb
represents an era where courts applied this power too liberally,275 as broad
judicial discretion to regulate law enforcement practices smacks of
interbranch encroachment.276 Most recently, the Court has cabined its
use.277 Judge John Gleeson suggests that it should be used only to remedy
“violations of federal law in the evidence gathering process that actually
prejudice the defendants.”278 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, in the email
cases only one defendant referred to this power, and implicitly at that.
B. The Courts Divide on Whether They Have Regulatory Authority to
Prevent Prosecutors from Reading the Defendants’ Legal Emails
In Fumo, defense counsel never explicitly contested the government’s
use of their client’s legal emails as evidence and the court thus admitted
them with little question.279 In National Urological Group, Asaro, and
Walia, upon concluding that the defendants’ legal emails were not
privileged, and that the prosecutors reading them did not impermissibly
restrict the defendants’ constitutional rights, the courts permitted the

272. Zacharias & Green, supra note 232, at 1311; see, e.g., Beale, supra note 244;
Gleeson, supra note 244.
273. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
274. Id. at 338–40 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239 (1941)).
275. Bennet L. Gershman, Supervisory Power of the New York Courts, 14 PACE. L. REV.
41, 47 (1994) (“[T]he rise and fall of supervisory power resembles a parabolic arc, beginning
with McNabb, reaching its crest . . . and then descending precipitously); Zacharias & Green,
supra note 236, at 412 (“McNabb . . . provided an open-ended definition of the
power . . . . Recent cases, however, have suggested that [it] may have gone too far . . . .”).
276. See Gleeson, supra note 244, at 428 (stating that “[judicial] attempts to supervise
investigations . . . interfer[es] with the appropriate divisions of powers among the branches
of government.”); see also Beale, supra note 244, at 1522 (“[S]eparation of powers dictates
that federal prosecutors . . . should perform their duties subject only to the requirements
imposed by the federal Constitution and statutes, not subject to the federal judiciary’s
preference for particular policies . . . .”).
277. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (reversing a district court order,
pursuant to its supervisory powers, that the government must present substantial exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury). The Court noted the grand jury’s institutional independence and
federal courts’ corresponding lack of competence to prescribe rules governing it. Id. at 49–
50.
278. See Gleeson, supra note 244, at 466–67.
279. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. Defense counsel did, however,
characterize the government’s behavior as an “Orwellian spectacle” that was “beneath the
dignity” of the court. Letter Brief in Response to Gov’t’s Reply Memorandum Regarding
Resentencing at 2, United States v. Luchko, No. 2:06-cr-00319 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2011).
This language closely recalls that used by the court in McNabb. See supra note 273–274 and
accompanying text. Defense counsel was thus, arguably, implicitly asking the court to
prevent the government from using the defendant’s email pursuant to its supervisory
authority over the administration of the criminal justice system. See generally supra Part
IV.A.2.c.
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prosecutors to read the defendants’ legal email.280 In allowing this,
however, all courts but the National Urological Group court expressed
significant discomfort with the practice, as well as sympathy for the
defendants’ inability to email their counsel confidentially.281
Presumably in hope of appealing to this sympathy, the defendants in
Asaro and Walia advanced several policy arguments regarding the benefits
confidential legal email provides.282 Based on these arguments, they
impelled the courts to exercise their inherent power to control their own
proceedings to prevent the prosecutor from reading their clients’ legal
email, notwithstanding the prosecutors’ ability to do so lawfully.283 In
Walia, the defense attorneys argued additionally that the inability to send
confidential legal email made it impossible for them to comply with their
obligations under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4,284 inviting the court to
exercise its delegated authority to enforce Rules of Professional Conduct.285
Despite their avowed sympathy for the defendants’ position, however, the
Walia and Asaro courts chose not to respond to any of these arguments,
concluding instead that there was no “legal basis” to prohibit the
government from reviewing the defendants’ legal emails.286
In Saade, however, despite never adjudging the practice illegal, the court
prevented the prosecutor from reviewing the defendant’s legal email.287
Upon discussing the issue at a pretrial hearing the court offered the
prosecutor, what it called, an “off the cuff reaction”: the court stated that
prosecutors should not be able to read inmate-attorney email because they
280. FTC v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-3294-CAP, 2012 WL 171621, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2012); Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at
30.
281. Transcript Sentencing Hearing Held on 11/10/11 at 47–48, Luchko, No. 2:06-cr00319 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2011), ECF No. 926 (expressing the court’s intuitive dislike of the
government “snooping around” on Fumo’s “private conversations”); Asaro Order, supra
note 16, at 2 (“[I]t would be a welcome development for BOP to improve TRULINCS so
that attorney-client communications could be easily separated . . . and subject to
protection.”); Walia Order, supra note 16 at 29–30 (noting that the Court does not
necessarily “agree with the position of the [government]” to review inmates’ legal email and
expressing sympathy for the burden that the inability to email counsel confidentially places
on the defendant).
282. First Walia Motion, supra note 58, at 3 (noting that there is “no meaningful
substitute” for email in today’s workplace, that using physical mail and arranging for legal
phone calls and visit are all very inefficient, and that public defenders have a particularly
demanding caseload); DiFiore Letter, supra note 44, at 4 (same).
283. DiFiore Letter, supra note 44, at 3; First Walia Motion, supra note 58, at 2.
284. First Walia Motion, supra note 58, at 2–3. Rule 1.4 enumerates a lawyer’s duties to,
inter alia, “reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s
objectives are to be accomplished,” and “keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4; see also N.Y. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
285. See supra Part I.C.2.
286. Asaro Order, supra note 16, at 2; Walia Order, supra note 16, at 30.
287. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Sade Held on 9/26/2011 at 7, United States
v. Saade, No. 1:11-cr-00111 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011). This type of indirect standard
setting is what Professors Zacharias and Green have argued is the most common form of
power federal courts employ to regulate federal prosecutors’ behavior. See supra Part
V.A.2.a.
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cannot eavesdrop on inmate-attorney meetings or phone calls, or read
inmates’ legal mail, and it should not “make a difference whether the mode
of communication is more modern or more traditional.”288 Shortly
thereafter the prosecutor volunteered to refrain from reading the defendant’s
legal emails.289
In Ahmed, the court conceded that the defendant’s legal emails were
unprivileged.290 In addition, it never addressed either the defendant’s
argument that in reading them the prosecutor impermissibly restricted his
right of access to counsel, or the defendant’s request for the court to
exercise its inherent powers to control its own proceedings to prevent this
behavior.291 The court nevertheless issued an oral ruling, pursuant to no
clear authority, expressly prohibiting the government from reading the
defendant’s legal emails.292
Unlike other courts treating this issue, the Ahmed court expressed a high
level of knowledge concerning the difficulty defendants and defense
attorneys face in arranging for in-person legal visits and unmonitored phone
calls at BOP facilities.293 In addition, the court took special exception with
the government’s contention that it was only choosing to review inmateattorney email because it could no longer afford to implement taint teams,
not because it sought to gain a strategic advantage.294 Finally, the court
noted in its opinion that the government could easily update TRULINCS to

288. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Sade Held on 9/26/2011 at 7, Saade, No.
1:11-cr-00111. Though the court did not explain its reasoning further, as Professor Orin
Kerr highlights, this type of “technology neutral” argument has been made by courts and
commentators in the related context of evolving technology as it applies to the Fourth
Amendment. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 561 (2009). See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir.
2010) (holding that “it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment
protection” than traditional mail).
289. Transcript of Proceedings As to Maroun Saade Held on 9/26/2011 at 10, Saade, No.
1:11-cr-00111.
290. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 5 (“There are certainly
admonitions . . . that the [emails] are not privileged . . . . But that’s not really what’s at the
heart of the issue here.”).
291. Compare Irizarry Letter, supra note 53, with Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note
9.
292. Tr. of Ahmed Conference, supra note 9, at 21 (“I’m going to tell you what we’re
going to do in this case. In this case, the government will be precluded from looking at any
of the attorney-client e-mails, period.”).
293. Id. at 19 (stating “I’ve had sit-downs with the warden at the [BOP facility where
defendant was detained] to cut down on the amount of wait time that the attorneys have
when they get there” and “[i]t can take up to . . . a month to arrange an unmonitored phone
call”).
294. Id. at 17–18 (“You’re going to tell me you don’t want to know what your
adversary’s strategy is? What kind of litigator are you then? Give me a break . . . . The
executive budget is far bigger than the judiciary’s budget, okay, and the defense budget. So
forgive me if I’m not overly sympathetic to the issue of the government having to put up a
taint team in order to avoid having to look at attorney-client e-mails.”).
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provide for a filtering function to segregate email between inmates and their
attorneys of record.295
In sum, courts have unanimously held that inmates’ legal emails sent via
TRULINCS are unprivileged,296 and no court has held that prosecutors
reading these emails impermissibly restricts inmates’ right of access to
counsel or right of access to the courts.297 As a result, despite expressing
various levels of sympathy for the defense position, the Fumo, National
Urological Group, Asaro, and Walia courts held that there was no legal
basis to prohibit the government from reading the defendants’ legal email.
The Saade and Ahmed courts, however, did just that, though pursuant to no
clear authority. Thus, either the Fumo, National Urological Group, Asaro,
and Walia courts were incorrect, or the Saade and Ahmed courts acted
beyond their authority’s scope.
C. Federal Courts Should Prevent Prosecutors from Reading Inmates’
Legal Email By Enforcing Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d)
The email cases evoked four forms of federal courts’ authority to regulate
federal prosecutors: their ability to enforce Rules of Professional
Conduct,298 their ability to set standards indirectly,299 their inherent power
to manage their own proceedings,300 and their supervisory authority over
the administration of the criminal justice system.301 The ability to enforce
Rules of Professional Conduct is the most appropriate form of this power
for a federal court to exercise in preventing a prosecutor from reading a
defendant’s legal email.
Though effective in practice, as in Saade and Ahmed, judicial acts that set
standards indirectly lack precedential value and raise separation of powers
concerns, especially when they constrain executive discretion.302
Preventing prosecutors from reading defendants’ legal email pursuant to
this power is therefore not optimal.
With regard to courts’ inherent power to manage their proceedings, it is
unsurprising that, despite defendants’ enjoinders, no court exercised this
authority to prevent prosecutors from reading defendants’ legal email.303 It
is unsurprising because this power’s function is to ensure the efficiency of
day-to-day courtroom operations, not to second guess lawful executive
evidence-gathering practices.304

295. Id. at 11 (“And I find it very hard to believe that the Department of Justice, with all
the resources that it has . . . cannot come up with a simple program that segregates identified
[attorney] e-mail addresses.”).
296. See supra Part II.C.
297. See supra Part IV.C.
298. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 287, 292 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 279.
302. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 283, 286 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
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Because barring judicially disfavored executive evidence-gathering
practices was once exactly what federal courts used their supervisory
authority over the criminal justice system to do,305 preventing prosecutors
from reading defendants’ legal email pursuant to this authority may appear
appropriate. As Judge Gleeson and others have argued persuasively,
however, liberal use of this authority smacks of inter-branch
encroachment.306 Pursuant to Judge Gleeson’s analysis of what constitutes
an appropriate exercise of this power,307 it is improper for federal courts to
prevent prosecutors from reading defendants’ legal email pursuant to it
because this behavior is not a clear violation of federal law.308
Unlike the three aforementioned non-delegated powers federal courts
exercise to regulate prosecutors’ behavior, Congress explicitly has
authorized federal courts to regulate federal prosecutors by enforcing Rules
of Professional Conduct.309 Judicial rulings pursuant to this authority,
assuming they are proper, therefore raise fewer separation of powers
concerns because they are grounded in congressionally delegated authority.
To be proper, such rulings must function as ethics rules—as opposed to
judicial policy preferences310—that either specifically cover the facts at
issue or can be reasonably interpreted to do so.311
Under the tests of the Tenth Circuit and Zacharias and Green,312 a rule of
professional conduct preventing prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal
email is an ethics rule. A rule preventing this behavior could apply to all
lawyers, including, as in Hatcher,313 defense attorneys seeking to eavesdrop
on cooperating witnesses’ legal communication. In addition, it would
address conduct that the legal profession consensually disfavors.314 Finally,
it would only affect attorney conduct, as neither BOP nor any other
institution would have to alter its practices.
Having determined that a rule preventing federal prosecutors from
reading inmates’ legal email would qualify as an ethics rule, the next
question is whether there is a rule of professional conduct that specifically
prohibits this behavior or can be reasonably interpreted to. It is possible
that state bar associations will publish formal ethics opinions that speak
directly to the issue of prosecutors reading inmates’ legal email. If this
occurs, a federal court could simply choose to adopt it, as was the case in
E.& W. Districts of Kentucky v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n.315 This is not likely to
occur anytime soon, however, because, as of this writing, only three states

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See supra notes 273–75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
See supra note 278.
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 252–54.
See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014).
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offer inmates the ability to send and receive email,316 presumably making
this an issue of little interest to state bar associations.
Because it is unlikely that a state bar association will issue an opinion
specifically addressing whether prosecutors can read inmates’ legal email, a
federal court seeking to prevent this practice on non-constitutional grounds
will have to apply a rule of professional conduct that can reasonably be
interpreted as proscribing it. As Zacharias and Green note, federal courts
often apply Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct
“prejudicial to the administration of justice,” to sanction or bar conduct that
is “plainly wrong” but not otherwise specifically proscribed.317 Rule 8.4(d)
is the most appropriate rule by which to prevent prosecutors from reading
inmates’ legal email.
Although Rule 8.4(d)’s open-textured wording has been understandably
criticized for being overinclusive, and thus raising due process concerns
because attorneys cannot predict how it will apply to them,318 preventing
federal prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email is within its scope.
As one set of commentators writes, the debate leading to the adoption of
Rule 8.4(d) by the ABA House of Delegates explained that it should only
apply to violations of clear norms and conventions of practice.319 In other
words, it should prohibit conduct that is “plainly wrong” in the profession’s
eyes, not just in the eyes of individual judges. Because prosecutors reading
defendants’ legal emails chills defendants’ ability to communicate
confidentially with counsel—an ability long recognized as critical to the
adversary system—all the parties litigating this issue, including the
government itself, have recognized its inappropriateness.320 Prosecutors
reading defendants’ legal email is thus precisely the type of conduct,
viewed as normatively improper within the profession but difficult to
foresee, that Rule 8.4(d)’s open-textured, flexible language was meant to
proscribe.
CONCLUSION
The American legal profession recognizes the ability to communicate
confidentially with an attorney as a—if not the—critical component of the
adversary system. As such, it is unsurprising that prosecutors reading
316. As of February 13, 2015, the only state department of corrections websites that
discuss a bidirectional email system for inmates are Iowa, New Hampshire, and South
Carolina. See O’Mail, IOWA DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.doc.state.ia.us/UploadedDocument
/380 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015); Inmate Email Service, N.H. DEPT’ OF CORR.,
http://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/policies/documents/5-24.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2015); Sending
Electronic Messages to an Inmate, S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.doc.sc.gov/
pubweb/family/sendingmessages.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
317. See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1079 (Mass. 2004); Matter
of Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 497 (N.J. 1982).
319. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 65.6, at
16 (3d ed. 2009); see also In re Matter of Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991) (holding
that with respect to broad standards “the guiding principle must be whether a reasonable
attorney . . . would have notice of what conduct is proscribed”).
320. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
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inmates’ unprivileged legal email, despite this practice’s legality, is
behavior that no one, not even prosecutors themselves, truly approves of.
At least one advocacy group has begun to pressure BOP to alter
TRULINCS in order to provide for unmonitored inmate-attorney email.321
Fortunately, because BOP provides for confidential legal visits, mail, and
phone calls it seems likely that it is only a matter of time before BOP
provides inmates the ability to email their attorneys confidentially.
Until BOP provides inmates’ confidential legal email, this Note argues
that prosecutors should abstain from reading inmates’ legal email as a
matter of self-regulation. It asserts that, in cases where they do not, there
are legal bases to prevent them. Prisoners’ rights advocates should
challenge BOP’s email monitoring policy under the theory that it
unconstitutionally restricts inmates’ right of access to counsel, and courts
should uphold this challenge. Where BOP’s email monitoring policy is not
at issue, or where a court seeks to avoid a constitutional decision, courts
should prevent prosecutors from reading inmates’ legal email by invoking
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d).

321. See, e.g., N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASS’N SECTION ON CIVIL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON PROSECUTORS READING INMATE-ATTORNEY EMAIL
13–16 (forthcoming September 2015) (on file with author).

